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Whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is
always a difficult issue, particularly so when the accused has testified. There is
little difficulty when an accused's exculpatory testimony is accepted by the trial
judge, since that of course leads unambiguously to an acquittal. More complex is
the situation where a trial judge does not simply accept the accused's version of
events — that is, most of the time. In those circumstances, trial judges must embark down the twisty road of deciding whether disbelieved testimony can nonetheless result in an acquittal, or alternatively whether an acquittal must still result from some other reason.
The primary guidance in these circumstances is the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in R. v. W. (D.).] In addition, though, a number of recent court of appeal decisions in several provinces have added guidance on applying those rules
in various circumstances. These decisions show the delicate balancing that is
necessary to, on the one hand, permit reasonable inferences, but on the other
continue to respect the need to require that convictions not occur without proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In W. (D.), the Court stressed that deciding whether an accused was proven
guilty had to require more than a consideration of whether the accused's evidence was believed, and more than choosing between the evidence of the
Crown's witnesses and the accused. Rather, the Court offered this advice:
A trial judge might well instruct the jury on the question of credibility along
these lines:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you
must acquit.
Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but
you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the
accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evi-
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dence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.2

Some guidance on what approaches do or do not comply with the requirements
of W. (D.) can recently be found. In R. v. Chittick (reported ante, p. 228), for
example, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was faced with a sexual assault conviction in which virtually all the evidence had arisen from the testimony of the
complainant and that of the accused. On most factors the parties agreed with one
another, though they disagreed over the issue of whether there was consent. In
particular the accused claimed that the complainant had only shown a sort of
reluctance consistent with the pattern of their previous consensual sexual relations, while the complainant testified that she had repeatedly asked the accused
to stop, and that his actions had been forceful. In convicting the accused, the
trial judge stated ".. .in assessing the credibility of both Mr. Chittick and [the
complainant], I'm satisfied that where there is any variance in the evidence of
the two parties, I accept the evidence of [the complainant] in this regard."3
The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge had foiled to comply with
W. (D.): in effect, that the judge had simply decided which of the two stories he
believed and, having believed the complainant, found the accused guilty. The
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that if that were what the trial judge had
done, then he would have been in error. However, they concluded that it was not
objectionable in itself for a trial judge to assess the credibility of the accused
against that of the complainant. Indeed, this was a necessary part of the process,
in that doing so would allow the judge to decide whether he or she believed the
accused's evidence, or whether the accused's evidence left a reasonable doubt
despite not being believed. What would be objectionable and an error would be
for the trial judge to treat the reasoning as complete at that stage, and immediately find the accused guilty. A comparison of credibility is acceptable, even
necessary, but it is not sufficient. What will remain undone is the third step:
consideration of whether the evidence which is accepted actually proves the
Crown's case beyond a reasonable doubt. On the particular facts in front of
them, the court found that the reasons of the trial judge, though flawed, nonetheless showed that he had undertaken that third step, and so there was no reversible error.
A similar point, with an additional gloss, arises from the Manitoba Court of Appeal's decisions in R. v. Moose (reported post, p. 246) and R. v. L. (C.J.) (reported post, p. 252). Each of those cases also presented conflicting testimonies,
again in the context of a sexual assault. In Moose the complainant alleged that,
having been unconscious after a night of drinking, she awoke early the next
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morning to find the accused attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. The
accused testified that he had left the home the night before, was not in the house
at the time the complainant described, and that no such incident involving him
had occurred. In L. (C.J.) the accused was charged with sexual assault of his
five-year-old niece: in essence, she testified that various sexual activity occurred, while he testified that it did not.
In each case, the trial judges began by setting out the guidelines in W. (D.) as the
governing approach.4 Both judges, however, began their analyses by considering
the evidence of the complainant rather than the accused. In L. (C.J.) the trial
judge considered the evidence of the complainant at some length, giving a detailed analysis of why he accepted it. When he turned to the accused's evidence,
he said little more than that he was not ready to accept it in the circumstances of
the case, and that it did not leave him with reasonable doubt. The court held that
these reasons were insufficient in the circumstances: rather, it was necessary to
offer some explanation as to why the accused's testimony was rejected. One
would expect an explanation relating to inconsistencies, evasiveness, demeanour, or other such reasons. In its absence, it was difficult to be certain that the
trial judge had not unintentionally reasoned that because he had accepted the
complainant's evidence, he therefore rejected the evidence of the accused. That
approach would be contrary to W. (D.), and would also shift the burden to the
accused.
In Moose, after considering the complainant's evidence and finding her credible,
the trial judge did briefly explain why he rejected the evidence of the accused.
He noted that the accused had been evasive when cross-examined on whether he
found the complainant attractive. The court found that evasiveness on this issue
was irrelevant, since the question itself was both irrelevant and improper.5
More generally, the point the Manitoba Court of Appeal made in both cases is
that the preferable course for a trial judge to follow is first to consider the evidence of the accused, and afterwards consider the evidence of the complainant,
rather than proceeding in the opposite order. Where, as in these cases, the judge
first accepts the complainant as credible, it will often be difficult to know
whether the accused's evidence is later rejected for any other reason than its
conflict with evidence already accepted. That in turn will make it difficult to tell
whether the judge has actually complied with W. (D.), rather than just treating

4ln Moose, the trial judge misstated the test from W. (D.), though the Court noted that this
error would not by itself be fatal if the reasons as a whole showed that the trial judge had
taken the correct approach.

Assuming a positive answer, where does the question and answer lead? It does not
follow that when a man finds a woman attractive, a sexual assault is likely to occur":
Moose, para. 22.

the case as one of "choosing sides".6 This is particularly so in cases, like L.
(C.J.), where there is nothing obvious or inherent in the accused's evidence itself to show why the accused was found not to be credible. On the other hand if
the judge begins by considering the accused's evidence, the particular reasons
for not accepting it, and for not finding that it leaves reasonable doubt, will be
clear. That will comply with the first two steps in W. (D.). When the judge then
explains why he or she does accept the complainant's evidence, this will make it
clearer that the third step in W. (D.) is also being undertaken.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Turmel (reported post,
p. 268) expands further on how W. (D.) is to be applied. That case again involved an allegation of sexual assault against a minor, though on this occasion
the accused did not testify in his own defence. The case therefore does not literally apply W. (D.), since there is no issue of believing or disbelieving the accused's testimony. Nonetheless the court relies on W. (D.) in finding that essentially the same approach must apply. A trial judge must not simply reason that
because he or she has believed the complainant the accused is therefore guilty:
the ultimate issue is not whether the complainant was credible but whether the
Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In effect, the Court finds
that believing the complainant's evidence is equivalent to the first two steps in
W. (D.): to finding that the accused's evidence is not believed and leaves no
reasonable doubt. It does not, however, satisfy the third step of demonstrating
that the evidence as a whole proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A judge
must therefore undertake that step as well, and not convict simply because he or
she believed the complainant.
Though one might be tempted to choose between competing stories as a way of
deciding the correct result on a criminal charge, it has long been clear that that is
not the correct approach. More subtly, though, conceptually it can be difficult to
see that accepting the testimony of a person who says an event occurred is not,
by itself, sufficient reason to take it as proven that the event occurred. The application of the W. (D.) principles in this variety of different contexts, therefore,

court does acknowledge its own previous decision in R. v. W. (R.S.) (1992), 74
C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Man. C.A.), where they had upheld a decision in which a trial judge,
having said he was completely convinced of the complainant's truthfulness, said "It follows from what I have said that I did not believe (the accused's) denial of the sexual
misconduct, nor did his evidence leave me with a reasonable doubt as to his guilt on any
of the three charges". In that case, though, they held that the trial judge had reasoned in
the proper order, first considering the accused's testimony and afterwards considering the
complainant's testimony. In delivering his reasons he expressed his findings as to credibility in the order the witnesses testified, but that was not, they concluded, the order in
which he had reached his findings.

provides helpful guidance on how best to assure that the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is properly respected.

